Social and Cultural Dynamics: Three Volumes ( Review)

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Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 1
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, Vol. I, Fluctuation of Forms of Art. The first hundred and ninety pages of this awe-inspiring work are devoted to a statement of the socio-cultural problems which the author proposes to analyze and to a general exposition of the methods to be used.The approaches and methods of other sorio philosophical investigations are compared at some length with the "logico-mcani netful" criteria of cultural integtation proposed by the author. These chapters will be of particular interest to the professed sociologist and are indeed logically and pedagogically necessary as an introduction to the work in its entirety. This is particularly true in relation to the second chapter in which the author discusses at great length the core of his thesis which is the classification or all cultural mentalities into two main divisions, the Ideational and the Sensate. Succeeding chapters demonstrate the occurrence of these types invarying cultures throughout historic time and discuss at length the problem of recurrence of sociological processes bo-h in time and space.The importance and interest of the work to the art historian and to those interested in art activity as an index of man's attitude toward his own existence ate brought out in the second part of the volume. Here Professor Sorokin has undertaken a truly remarkable exposition of his theory of the concurrence and alternation or the Ideational and Sensate mentalities in art throughout recorded history. The essential nature of these two attitudes as reflected ia an form; is defined in great detail and comparisons are made with other theories of alternation and progress. The author then proceeds with his monumental analysis of historic ceidenee. In this no field or period is left untouched but the weight of the proof is largely borne by the Greco Roman and subsequent Western cultures as expressed in painting andsculpture. Here no bibliographical stone has been left unturned to demonstrate the inevitability w .rli which the Ideational or Sensate mentalities or their mixtures determine the character of art at any one time and to point out the unbroken sequence of the successive waves of domination of each type from the Creto-Mycenean culture to the present. A most convincing array of factual evidence is assembled to show how closely the cycles of Western art follow the pattern of the Greco-Roman culture and to indicatethat we are today in a cultural phase similar to that of Rome at the beginning 0/ the Christian era. The evidence in the fields of painting and sculpture is further supplemented by a resume of the evidence in the fields of architecture, music, literature and criticism.
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 1
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, These qualitative investigations are supplemented by quantitative analyses of the special fields of Western painting and sculpture. The resulting statistical tabulations are used to confirm the qualitative description and cenionsltate a iccthodoluci which at ieasi cannot but forestall criticism as to lack of detailed thoroughness. However, as a matter of book making andclarity this statistical analysis could well have been relegated to an appendix since it tends to mire the general reader in a mass of facts and figures which a:c unnecessary to the main theme though possibly of interest to thescholar.To the author, the history of art when properly analyzed is a continuous dcmonsiration of the constant interaction of the Ideational and Sensate cultural tendencies. These two attitudes or methods of thought are always ship determining at any one time the direction and character of artistic creation. In this flow there is no hiatus since the cultural life of mankind began but a constant flux without beginning or ending, varying merely in quality and quantity. This entirely contradicts the biological parallel which is at present the most commonly accepted theory of cultural process. In art the Ideational mentality is reflected by a concentration on thepresentation and demonstration of the supersensory realities, the eternal truths, so to speak, of a state of being independent of time and space. Its expression is, therefore, basically symbolic, non-realistic, and slow to change. The Sensate attitude, on the other hand, is essentially visual, naturalistic and dynamic in its interests. When these two attitudes are in balance with the Sensate current on the increase an Idealistic stage is attained which is represented by the artsof fifth century Greece and Western Huronc in the thirteenth century. Art is then at its richest. The parallel mixture m hen Sensate current is on the wane does not, according to our author, produce a like balance but a period of conflict and of rapidly changing trends which presages the later recrudescence of the Ideationalphase. A period of this type occurred in the fourth century of our era and, according to the author, is occurring at present.I'rom this brief note it will be seen that there is nothing teally extremely novel in these theories themselves though they may be more novel in their strictly historical and sociological aspects. Most of the ideas involved haveappeared before bur it is safe to say that they have never before been awe inspiring body of factual evidence and authoritative quotation.This first volume alone is a monument to the author's wide culture, extraordinary erudition and imaginative grasp. The fields treated show an nsioiiishingly wide acquaintance with the bibliography of art history such as could ordinarily be expected only of a specialist. The author's use of material is often refreshingly unhampered by the specialist's tendency to conservatively qualify a generalization.On the whole Ptofessor Sorokin makes out an excellent case for his Ideational Suisate analysis of Western art in painting and sculpture. Hisit of architecture is, however, less convincing possibly because he
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 1 & 2
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, is here dealing with a far more complex problem which requires not only aprofound understanding of history but a first-hand, intimate aquaintance with the morphology of style. The "satellites" or symptoms of the dual tendencies are here less patent and in consequence the author makes many statements which if not actually contrary to tact seem most certainly to contort the truth to fit the simple outlines of his scheme. In a work of this stupendous sweep, especially when the author has such evident fervor of conviction with what must of necessity be a rather second-hand acquaintance with his material, there is the inevitable tendency to select facts and quotations with a view to bolstering the theory.By and large, however, no matter what exceptions may be and undoubtedly will be taken to the author's individual statements and conclusions, there is an extraordinary amount of valuable end intcrestinc material inthe seven hundred odd pages of the volume. The book offers a most stimulating challenge to all who are striving for a way out of the conflicting mass of special pleading and conjecture which makes up contemporary art philosophy. It will also serve as an excellent corrective to a too sectional view of the materia] covered and is a most powerful argument for the study ofart as a humanity. As for its final authority, the aurhor himself will probably be the first to admit that no one theory can by itself reveal the mainsprings of titan's creative urges. Even to one unversed in the technicalities of sociological investigationthe book is more than well worth reading, though the present reviewer would have found it much more effective had the author evidenced less personal bias for one side of his dualism. There is more than a touch of the propagandist in the chapters of the book presumably devoted to pure exposition which is definately irritating. The style, too, is rather annoyingly prolix and repetitious and savors somewhat too much of the needs of the note-taking student. By and large it seems to the reviewer that the meatof the matter could have been set- forth with egear clarity in one-half thespace, the rest of the material being relegated to an appendix where itcould have been referred to in case of necessity by the more careful reader.Perhaps it is one of the faults of our Sensate days that we find ourselvesreluctant to wade through apparently unnecessary verbage.M. R. Rogers City Art Museum of St. LouisVol. II, Fluctuation 0/ Systems of Truth, Ethics and LawIn this rather pretentious volume Professor Sorokin applies to intellectual history hts discovery that all things social have tended to "fluctuate"instead of pursuing a uniform course in a determinate direction. With agreat wealth of statistical charts he illustrates the fact that ideas and basicintellectual attitudes have also had their ups and downs, tn the course ofelaborating upon what has indeed been already suspected but never soemphatically nibbed in, he makes several points of which American socialscientists may ncoi reminding. They have recovered from the evolutionary bias of a generation agao; but they could still do with more historical per-
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 2
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, spective and more imaginative insight into other frames of Intelligibility than their own. What Sorokin calls "the cultural relativity of truth" implies that even oar schemes of science, our methods of scientific inquiry and verification, can hardly be taken as ultimate, but must stand their chances with those of other ages and cultures. It may take courage for a sociologist to say, "The main works of Plato or Aristotle ot St. Thomas I would not exchange for all the textbooks on sociology of the postwar period taken together." Those to whom such a preference has long been obvious may now rejoice that a sociologist has buttressed it with his statistics and graphs; science has spoken. What more the Harvard professor has added to the position of the man of education and culture appraising the past, is somewhat difficult to say.In adopting his statistical method, he explains, he is intentionally following"the empirical system of truth," with its "quantitativism" and "mechanis-ticism," in order to convince those who believe in such "scientism." Thatlie does not hi in sell share this belief or lake this method seriously lie makesabundantly clear. It Is indeed one of the worst by-products of our degenerate age. "The aspiration and habit of being 'objective' and 'quantitative' lead to a similar result. When all one's hopes are placed in the'objectivity' of a questionnaire, in tabulating machinery, or in other mechanical procedures and 'techniques,' one finds that such operations arenot conducive to abstract analytical thinking or to the construction of avast lasting and 'realistic' synthetic theory. . . . The place of penetratingand concentrated thought is taken by these mechanical operations; ... thetabulating machine, the coefficient of correlation ... are believed to be thepatented ways to the kingdom of truth. Hence an outstanding lack of skilland a childish innocence of theoretical thinking is characteristic of presentday sociology... As a rule, onli the best-known and most routine types of phenomena have reliable quantitative data; only the simplest and thebest-known phenomena can be studied 'overtly' or 'objectively.' . . . Hencethe nemesisof the fact-finder: they find usually only such facts as are alreadywell known; their study of these is often but a 'painful elaboration of theobvious.'" Passages like this so well describe Sorokin's own method thatit is difficult to believe he is not writing with his tongue in his cheek. Indeed,it is much easier to take his whole elaborate work as a parody of Americansocial science, and it does vastly more credit to his intelligence, than totreat it seriously as a contribution to the theorv of history. To apply thesolemnity of the researcher to one of those clever ideas that arise over theafter-dinner coffee cups and lead to a brilliant conversation, would indeedbe a stroke of satirical genius.In the history of ideas, "fluctuation" seems to mean no more than thatthere has been a "Dark Ages." The Greeks made quite an intellectualachievement, as have the moderns; but by interpolating a long "medievalperiod," one can redress the balance for almost any idea. There may wellbe another "Middle Ages": the truth as taught in totalitarian states bodesill for the continued advance of science. Science has indeed been progressingin geometrical ratio for the last six or seven centuries; but the presence of
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 2
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, the Dark Ages succeeding Greek thought makes the disappearance of suchscience "as probable" as its continuing irrowth. That the statistics are deal-fourteenth century was basically oinerent in character from that which the( decks discovered; that it has been dependent on a support in technologywhich Greek science never enjoyed these are consideration-; which Sorokindoes not deign to mention. His study is wholly statistical and phenomalistic.He does not even attempt to correlate any of these intellectual currentswith the material 'actors in their culture; it is always one idea played offagainst another. The only reason he assigns for their rise or decline is "theprinciple of in: it! an era self-re eulario:: ,,f so.iocolter.il processes." "Sooneror later the prejudices and limitations of any single current call forth ever-inereasini: criticism and result ill the reappearance of its rivals, theirgrowth, and the overthrow of the dominant current." By such "immanentcausation" each idea has a limit after which it has to "turn its direction,without interference from external factors; it exhausts its potentialities.And so it goes, forever and ever."Sorokin makes no pretense at objectivity: his pages are full o! such jiuic-ments as that Freud views man as "a mere bag filled with filthy sex,"or that pragmatism states, "What is pleasant is true." He believes that"each form of truth has its own important function and is equally necessary"; the whole truth is a blending of all the spectrum into white. Thisblend occurred when both "ideational" and "sensate" views were combined in "idealism," during the fourth century B.C. and again in the thirteenth. In those periods there was a rich variety of views, a nice balancebetween the different types of truth; each of the many rays of the WholeTruth had its representative, faith, reason, and the senses. Now all thegraphs clearly indicate that quantitatively our own period is closest tothese other two "idealisms." It is therefore rather perplexing to find itclassified as a "devil's spectrum," and assailed by all the resources of arich vituperative vocabulary. Sorokin seems divided between fear of the'dictatorship of irrational faith"—see Russia and Germany —and hope ofa Neo-Scholasticism. One gathers, however, that anything would be betterthan our "over-ripe Sensate culture."The doubts of these grandiose generalizations and eternal laws, basedon two dubiously related episodes, increase with a detailed examination.Obviously all these graphs depend on the categories employed, and on theway individual figures are classified. Throughout Sorokin seems gcneta'lyarbitrary and often demonstrably wrong; with few exceptions he followsvery conventional and antiquated judgments. Only by bringing in the term"ideational truth" for the beliefs held in those periods when men did notthink at all can he give weight to his favorite positions. Both Plato andAristotle are of course "idealists; surprisingly, they were "scholastics,"and believed in a revealed truth of faith. Aristotle was a monistic idealist:he viewed "the individual systems of spiritual reality as mere temporaryemanations or one spiritual principle of Being." N'eo-Plaiunlsm was in contrast pluralistic. Aristotle maintained an "ideational" and "eternalistic"
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 2 & Volume 3
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, concept of time, the 17th century a "sensate" one. Galileo the Aristoltelian was a rationalist, Newton the Platonist was an empircist. Augustine was an indeterminist, Calvin a determinist. All science, on the other hand, is calmly identified with the crudest and most out of dated form of seen sationalistic empiricism; it merely describes the possibilities of perception. It has become "dreamy and illusionist ic," shifting erratically from one fashionable theory to another; Sorokin seems to have little understanding of modern science or its various interpretations. He does not even include the critical philosophy of Kant, the dominant scientific philosophy of the nineteenth century, with science at all; that would upset his graphs. He sees complete opposition between the "Idealistic rationalism" of Plato and Aristotle, and the "sensate empiricism" of our mathematical physics, in which reasoning plays little part; in truth, the mixture of sense and reason is about the same in each.Such misconceptions might be multiplied ad nauseam. They make it clear that by a proper unstacklng of the cards Sorokin's graphs might be made to reverse themselves. The basis of his entire structure is thus arbitrary and quite lacking in objectivity; it is an expression of personal preference and prejudice, abetted by lack of first-hand knowledge or judgment of the ideas and men classified. It Is a pleasant game, and so obviously such that we cannot but believe that Professor Sorokin is gently spoofing us. It might be added that in the two chapters on law, he has enjoyed the co-operation of N.S. Timashcff, who really knows something about ins subject.John: Herman Randall, Ja.Vol. III, Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War and RevolutionThe third volume of Professor Sorokin's book deals with the social aspects of the social aspects of the sociocultural world. It consists of four parts. Proceeding from a general typology of social groups the history of Western society is analyzed in terms of" these types and divided into five periods according to the predominance of familistic, contractual and compulsory relationships respectively. Two special systematic chapters on the fluctuation of theocratic and secular forms of government and leardersip and on that of "ideational" and "sensate" liberty conclude this "qualitative" analysis of soial relationships. Quantitative questions are then dealt with in terms o foscillations between "totalitarianism" and "laissez-faire-anarchy". A chapter on the fluciuations of economic conditions in the history of Greece, Rome, France, and Germany closes the first part of the volume. Parts II and III are deveoted to stateistical studies of war and internal disturbances, the last part to an inquiry into the relation between culture, personality and conduct. The various extensive reasearches, on which the generalizations are based were underatken in cooperation with a score of specialists. N.S. Timasheff
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume III
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, assisted in collecting source material for the analysis of the structural changes in state, church, family, guilds, corporations and kindred associations; communities, and the bonds between the social sttata. The chapter on the economic conditions was written in co-operation with (G. Mickwitz, P. A. Ostrouchov, S. G. Pushkareff, P. Savitzy and E. F. Maximovitch. The study of international conflicts, based on a quantitative analysis of almost 1,000 wars, was conducted with the collaboration N. N. Golovine and A. A. Saitzoff. N. S. Timasheff and S. Oldenburg co-operated with the author in the analysis of some 1,622 revolutions and other interna] disturbances. The last part of the volume is based on data collected in a doctoral dissertation by John V. Boldyreff who classified all the historical personalities mentioned in the 9th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannicaaccording to Ideational and Sensate types of petsonality ("the unknown being put into the class of the Mixed)" An appendix of 63 pages gives a detailed-account of the way in which each war and revolution was weighed fot statistical putposes. A considerable amount of further material utilized but not presented in the present volume has been deposited in the Sociological Library of Harvard University.If one considers that the book also contains various theoretical and methodological discussions, as well as numerous passages in which its findings are related to the results of the two preceding volumes, one can only wonder at the literary achievement; the reader never gets lost in the welter of details, erudite references and polemical remarks. The clarity and simplicity of the fundamental conception of history which buttresses the structure of the book and which is impressed upon the reader's mind by each chapter anew is of inestimable didactic value. The three fundamental forms of social relationship, familistic, contractual, compulsory, are first presented as special combinations of certain modalities of intetaction. The familistic type for example is all-embracing in extencity, high in intensity, purely solidary in direction, anil durable. On cioser analysis the author concludes, however, that the types cannot be adequately defined at a nominalistic way. The typology is in fact methodologically inconsistent. Three different criteria are used for distinguishingthe three Concepts. A phenomenological criterion serves to discriminate compulsory and noncompulsory relations, whether they are familistic or contractual. The distinction thus ubtained corresponds to that betweensolidarity (harmony) and intragroup antagonism (disharmony). The distinction within the noncompulsory class is then made by means of a moral criterion and of a psychological criterion: Both subtypes display solidarity. But in the familistic type the solidarity exists with references to meta-empirical values, in the contractual type with reference to empirical (utilitarian) values. This moral distinction corresponds to that "ideationalism" and "sensatism" in the author's terminology and thus enables him to establish later the association between social and cultural systems; This association exists in the medium of values. The psychological criterion is derived from the observation that the "personality" of a group member may be wholly or only partly involved in
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume III
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, the social relations. This is clearly demonstrated by the author with reference to the phenomenon of the stranger. There is no strangeness in purely familistic relarions, partial strangeness in contractual groups and completestrangeness in compulsory relations. Thus, the contractual type is opposed in principle tu the compulsory type according to the phenomenoiogical criterion, whereas the psychological criterion establishes merely a distinction of degree.It is true that the contractual type lies between the familistic and compulsory types It is not an independent form, however, but resultstrom anambivalent combination of the mutally supplementary elementsof solidarity and compulsion. Its affinity withthe compulsory type resides in the pursuit of "utilitarian" ends which is common to both of them (according to the description which Professor Sorokin gives of compulsion). The contractual relation is seen as "in a sense egotistic" (p.30), a characterization which also holds for compulsion. The affinity between contractual and familistic relations on the other hand consists in the fact that solidarity as such is an "ideational" phenomenon that cannot be explained in terms of utility, even if it obtains for guaranteeing the pursuit of utilitarian, egotistic ends. One might say that both the consensus concerning the pursuit of egotistic ends and the vacdity of a contract presupposes therecognition of metaempirical values; or, to put it defferently, in as much as men are solidary, even if only within a contractual section of their activities, they are not strangers to each other. In as much as they lack confidence, which they frequently do according to the author's description, the contractual type is a "mixed type" composed of familistic and compulsory relations.The familistic and contractual types are depicted in such a way by Professor Sorokin that there remain elements which cannot be understood in terms of solidarity-com pulsion. These can only be introduced on historical grounds or on the basis of a theory of the division of functions which presupposes in turn a theory of man's relation to non-human nature, man, and God. The problem becomes less involved when one realises that the term "contract" refers merely to the mode of establishing a relationship, not to its nature. As Professor Sorokin rightly points out, many of the feudal relations were contractual in origin but "familistic" in character. The term "contractual" then has its place m a classification of modes of originating social relationships, along with traditional, compulsory and other ways of initiation. But despite Spencer and the pre- and post-Spencerian tradition, "Contract" has no place in a typology of social relations as such. Since the nature of what Professor Sorokin calls the "contractual relationship" is not "contract," it must be defined in entirely different terms. Different objections are called forth by the use of the term "familistic." The family, or rather "the good and harmonious family" (p.29), Is only one group with solidarity on metaempirical values. The choice of the word "iamibstic" can be justified only on grounds of expediency in research, since often in history other groups (Church, Community, friendships) have indeed reflected on their solidarity in terms of family relations.
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume III
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, The terminological question would be negligible, If It did not imply the systematic problem of the ground of solidarity. This should have been explored in the chapter on liberty. Freedom is psychologically defined as resulting from the sum of wishes in relation to the sum of means to gratify them. The formula is sufficient to reject the behavioristic postion and it serves to demonstarte that there is both an "inner Ideational way of being free," even if means happen to be scarce, and an "external Sensate way"of being unfree, even if there appears to be an abundance of means. But the definition fails to give the discussion a turn away from psychology which would deepen the understanding: In the "ideational" context the essential human attitude is not "inner freedom," possibly obtained through minimization of "wishes," but the recognition of transcendental values with which the person is confronted (responsibility, obedience). The "wishes" enter only in so far as the "ideational man" is free when he wishes to obey.The formulation indicates that the moralistic conceptions of society and culture—ideational vs. sensate; familistic vs. contractual-compulsory do not adequately convey the meaning which the fundamental terms involve. Only in the chapter on government in which the phenomenon of obedience is in the center of the discussion, at least implicitly, the types of government which correspond to "ideationalism" and "sensatism" are called "theocratic" and "secular." Here, then, is a direct allusion to thetheological implications of the fundamental distinction. Professor Sorokin's whole work is indeed linked with Its great predecessors, Comte and Spencer, i.e., in its being a sociological history of secularization. It is this process of secularization to which he could have attributed the disintegration of solidarity. In other words, certain implications of his philosophical position seem to point to the conclusion that the ground of solidarity is religion, and the nature of the contractual relationship might have been defined as secularized Gemeinsehaft. If my critique is correct, it has a bearing upon the historical research contained in the volume. The principal critical conclusions that there isneither a cyclical nor a progressive development in history stands on firm grounds, and I fully subscribe to it. But the distinction between different historical periods of priedominantly familistic, contractul; and compulsory relations respectively depends on the validity of the concepts. I do not think that it is fruitful to apply these concepts to historical reality, even if they are consistent formulations. The result will always be the extinction of historic individuation, i.e., of the concrete meaning of historical configurations. The truth that might be gained this way can better be obtained philisophocally. Historical studies require a conceptual basis consisting of historical types. Professor Sorokin makes much use of statistical methods. This distinguishes his encyclopedic study of history from its predecessors. The method yields its must intetesting results in the chapter on uar. Despite the recognized uncertainty of source material pertaining to the quantitative aspects of war he has made an attempt, unparalleled in scope, to arrive at generalizations concerning the fluctuations of "war maginitude" in his-
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume III
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, tory. The research contained in this part is the most valuable contribution to sociology made in the ptesent volume. In other parts the statistical method is used with less caution. For example, the chapter on economic conditions contains various instances of objectionable inferences from the curves, which were obtained in the following way. Experts expressed thecomparative status of economic well being on a scale from 1 to 10 ("verybad" to "excellent'); for each specified period. They took into account the total sociocultural and economic "configuration," so that a great number of symptoms entered into the diagnosis. Thus the resulting value, say "satisfactory" (6 on the scale), derives its meaning from the total context to which it refers. This context changes historically, so that the value 6 with reference to a different context has an entirely different meaning.It is possible to say that the general economic situation in France was 6 in the years 1115, 1350, 1480, 1585, 1610, 1650, 1685, 1740, 1786, 1800, 1920 and 1925 (cf. fig. 4 on p. 236). But it is meangless to say that the economic conditions were equal or similar in those twelve different years since the curve which connects the various quantified value -judgments has no meangful context to which it itself refers. It is merely a geometrical form of connecting numerical symbols; for the meangful unit of "configuration" there has been substituted the meaningless unit of mathematiical time in order to obtain a curve. This procedure overlooks that curvesof this kind remain meaningful only as long as the assumption of constancy of " configuration " of constancy can reasonably he made. Professor Sorokin, commenting on the curves, docs not confine himself to (very instructive) infoerences concerning the comparative status of social strata. He make staements like this: "Even in the nineteenth century the landed aristocracy (in German) did not again reach the level of the leventh and twelfth centuries " (p.245). He disregards the limitations of the method and anticipates critique with very vehement indignation. He certainly must be aware that this question is burdened with a distressing number of most intricate philosophical problems, including the character of linguistic symbols, the nature of historical individuation, the relation between "reason" and "existance". I do not understand, therefore, how he considers the fact that quantitativejudgments are constantly being made by every historian sufficient justification for the use he makes of statistics. The methodological problem is not what the historian does, but what he may do; or more concretely, within what limits he is justified in doing what he does.Professor Sorokin's principal conclusion, that we live at present in a disintegrating "sensate" culture and that compulsory relations have gained in eminence, holds independently of the typology of social relations. The prediction, however, that the future belongs to a new ideational man cannot be inferred from the observation that social and cultural forms fluctuate. It should be noted that he has shown no historical precedence of the recurrence of predominantly familistic relations within the same culture. The history of Western society has been the history of enlightenment, i.e., of secularization. "Society" follows "community," and Tonnies, Max Weber, Sombart and others have left no doubt that, if history is seen in
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume III
Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, the light of the distinction between "community" and "society," the process from community to society is irreversible.Professor Sorokin's prediction is indeed based not on the historical material he has analyzed but on the "principle of limit." This principle involves the conception that culture will not disintegrate as a postulate. The "imminent logic of history" (p. 250 et passim) will bring us back to "ideationalism". "When one set of forces becomes too strong, in some way orfor some reason, other forces are set in motion in the opposite direction" (p. 481). Considering the author's disinclinarion to use the term equilibrium, the postulate seems to be vitalistic rather than mechanistic, an inference that is supported by frequent allusions to "pulsations." "ripeness" of cultures, cultural manifestations of "exuberance," the "health" of a social body and the like.Only the forthcoming fourth volume, however, ran show whether this interpretation is correct. If it is, the justified prediction would be thatdeath is the certain end of every culture. In any case, the postulate has the philosophical function of conferring meaning upon the future, and in this way it gives an immanent meaning to history. It can be proved, however, that the temptation to give Immanent meaning to history exhists only for a philosophy which is ultimately based upon a distrust of the transcendental character of norms.