Logico-meaningful method of P.A. Sorokin
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0001
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, One cannot without trepidation undertake to comment upon the new social philosophy which has emerged from the ruins of a noisilydisintegrating and ever-ripe sensate culture. The sheer magnitude of Social and Cultural Dynamic!, together with the prodigious researchProfessor Sorokin displays in analyzing all the compartments of culture over a period of twenty-five centuries without overlooking any part of our contemporary civilization, demands that a critic proceed warily. It is unfortunate in one respect that these pontifical tomes cannot be considered in their entirety, for such a possibility winili! relieve tin: impression that a lew weak points have been singled out for attack. Since, however, the catagory of space presses so urgently upon the denizens of sensate cultures, these remarks must be limited to a matter of more strictly sociological interest, namely, the "logtco-meaningful method" which the author presents in his introductory chapter. While a number of fallacies and inconsistencies require the employment of the forensic shillalah in opposition to this so-called method and the approach it represents, it is important to emphasize that subsequent statement! are intended in no way to impugn or to evaluate IWcssor Novokin's ninpiii/iiiitnii opus either as a philosophy of history or as a social philosophy in general. The purview of this paperis stringently confined to an examination of the author's contribution to the methodology of sociology. After a cursory discussion and definition of "culture" Professor Sorokin classifies the interrelations of the elements and traits of culture into four basic types, (i) spatial or mechanical adjacency,(2) association due to an externa] factor, (3) functional or causal integration, and (4) internal orlogico-meaningful unity. Spatial or mechanical represents the lowest and loosest form of culture integration. Traits, attributes, customs,mores, institutions, rites, ceremonies, and artifacts related only spatially
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0002
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, can hardly, in fact, be considered as integrated at all. Rather they may be regarded as a simple congeries of cultural elements "in a given area of social and physical space, with spatial or mechanical concurrence as the only bond of union."1 The second type, "indirect unification through a common external factor" stands a step higher on the continuum of integration, but remains only a very low and loose form of association. The third type of relationship, the causal or functional, implies a combination of cultural dements held together by bonds inherent in their nature and becomes, accordingly, a relatively high form of integration. The relationship is a tangible one, and the parts cling together in such a way that none of them can vary independently without damaging the unity of the system as awhole. In Sorokin's own words, "Any cultural synthesis is to be regarded a functional when, on the one hand, the elimination of one of its important elements percept ibiy influences the rest of the synthesis ice its functions (and usually in its structure'!; and 'hen, on the other hand, the separate element, being transposed to a quite different combination, either cannot exist in it or has to undergo a profound modification to become a part of it. Such is the symptomatic barometer of internal integration."1 The more or less subtle differences between these first three forms of integration, the nature of the continuum which they represent, and the merits or demerits of theclassification in genera! may he disregarded in favor of the greater significance of the fourth type of association. Logico-meaningful integration is the supreme form of association of the elements of culture; beside it all other forms, including the causal-functional, merely adumbrate an integration. It is the type of integration exemplified by the lines of a great poem, the pages of the Critique of PureReason, the fragments of a statue, or the measures of a symphony. "If we know the proper patterns of meaning and value," says Sorokin, "we can put these pages or parts together into a significant unity in which each page or fragment takes its proper place, acquires a meaning, and in which all together give the supremely integrated effect that was intended."' All the parts of these cultural manifestations are woven into a "seamless garment" whose unification is "'far closer than that of mere functional association."' The minor premise and conclusion of a syllogism follow logicol-meaningfully from the major premise—not causally or functionally. "To say that the chapters of Kant's Critique, or the head and the torso of the Venus of Milo, or the beginning and the end of the first movement of Beethoven's Third Symphony, or the foundation, flying buttresses, towers and sculpture of the Cathedral of Chartres, or the first and the second partsof the Iliad—to say that the connection between these is functional or ' Social tnJ Cultural Dynamics, American Book Company, 1937, vol. I, fluctualtion of Forms of Art, p. 10. All subsequent references are to this volume unless other wise noted
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, causal is to say something almost absurd and, at the same time, to omit the higher nature of their unity.'" With these statements, however, Sorokin merely succeeds in bowling over a number of straw men. No one has ever asserted that the transcendental aesthetic of Kant's Critique causes the transcendental dialectic; that the head of the Venus of Milo causes the torso; that the beginning ofa Beethoven symphony causes the end; or that the foundations of the Cathedral of Chartres cause the flying buttresses. It would be just as "absurd"—to use Sorokin's word—to say that a part of anything causes another part, or that the parts cause a whole. Rather, the parts comprise a whole, a sort of relationship wholly distinct from the category of causation, and also from the sensate-ideational categories of the logico-meaningful method. -Sorokin's assertions at this point are unquestionably validi, and therefore unnecessary, for no one has yet denied them. When he believes that the logico-meaningful method excels the causal-functional on these grounds, however, he misrepresents the function and use of the latter. When Sorokin begins his investigation of any congeries of culture traitshe expects first of all to apply the canons of inductive and deductive logic to them to determine whether or not, and to what extent, they are logically related. Then, sprinkling in a bit of "meaning" he hopes to discover the presence or absence of integration. Since he atlmils the cumbersomeness of the concept "logico-meaningful" its use could easily be condoned if it did not, at the same time, exhibit a serious misconception regarding the nature of logic. There is no logical relationship between objects or phenomena; logic, as the formal science of the structure of thought, applies to the words we use to describe them. Not cultures, hut only what we say about them can be logically integrated. Nor are culture traits logically related. Logic is an instrument of discourse and applies not to things in themselves but towhat is said about them. Logical judgments find their proper locus in propositions; not in events or objects. The separate pages and parts of Sorokin's symphonies and sonnets and statues are no more logically related than they are causally related. To diseuss logically-related culture traits or phenomena is to mix universes of discourse in the first instance, and in the second is to apply logic to a sphere where it has no place. Objects and traits either exist or they do not exist; they are not true or false or logically integrated. Only propositions and judgments are susceptible of truth claims, falsity claims, and logically related claims. Although Sorokin states that what "must be used are the logical laws of identity, contradiction, and consistency,"1 he fails to illustrate how they can be applied to culture traits. Possibly the illustration was omitted because it is difficult to furnish one. On the other hand, the fallacy can be illustrated. Consider any two traits or objects from an integrated culture.
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, such as, for example, the armor and the lance of a medieval knight. Are the armor and the lance identical? Are they contradictory? Are they consistent? Consistent with what? Again, is a table fork more logically related to and therefore more consistent with a spoon than a pitchfork? Objects can not be identical, contradictory or consistent in themselves; only the statements we make about them in relating them to another principle or proposition can be consistent. It may be remarked in passing that consistency, although a desideratum of logical discourse, is not a law of logic in the sense that the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle are laws. Thus, although Sorokin invokes, logic to lend cogency to his method, it is impossible to concede that the "logico-meaningful method"has anything to do with logic. In addition, the selection of the word "meaningful" can only be regretted. The philosopher who first gives us an adequate explanation of meaning will not have to construct an epistemological architectonic to gain a grade of twelve from Sorokin.The following statements demonstrate that the logico-meaningful method is more closely akin to mysticism than to logic: "Many . . . superlative unities cannot be described in analytical verbal terms; they are just felt as such"; "Some associations are sensed as the supreme unities"; "Some chains of reasoning are felt as logical" and, "Not being completely describable in terms of language," the supreme unity of the creations of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Shakespeare, Phidias, Durer, Raphael, or Rembrandt "is fill by competent persons as certainly as if they could be analyzed with mathematical or logical exactness. Such expressions not only repudiate logic but recall the mystics of "ideational" cultures upon whom were bestowed gifts for explaining to their less fortunate contemporaries the mysteries of human life and destiny, the knowledge of which they had themselves secured through divine afflatus or, possibly, through logico-meaningful methods. That uninhibited "feeling" produces profoioid aesilietic pleasures need not be denied even by a "sensate" mentality. How anincursion into aestlnics oranagoge can help to integtate the highly complex traits of both literate and non-literate cultures, however, escapes the comprehension of "sensate" critic. Furthermore, if a "felt" unity implies one that is self-evident, the caution of Bertrand Russell may be observed:"If self-evidence is alleged as a ground of belief, that implies that doubt has crept in, and that our self-evident proposition has out always resisted the
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0005
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, assaults of scepticism," Sorokin has, of course, wholly succumbed to phenomenological dialectics and has slipped innocently over the distinction between methods and objectives. As George A. Lundberg says, "The error lies in overlooking that insight and understanding are the ends at which all methods aim, rather than methods in themselves. What does Sorokin expect from his logico-meaningful analysis of the traits of a particular culture? He says:If we discover that this culture does contain the appropriate body of traits andvariables, by one strake we obtain several important cognitive results: (l) a highlyintimate and certain understanding of manv of important aspects of the culture; (1) an insight into the nature and workings of most of its significant components; (3) knowledge of the spectrum of its dominant mentality; (4) a comprehensive grasp of the very complex network of relationships between many of its traitswhich otherwise would escape us; and (5) an answer to the question as to whether or not, and to what extent and in what parts, the culure is indeed logically integrated. Because of the normative word "appropriate" which has been used here it becomes evident that the conclusions which Sorokin espects are tautological. To say that if we find that a culture contains the appropriate bodv of traits and variables we know that it is logically integrated is equivalent to saying that if we find that a culture is logically integrated we know that it is logically integrared. These "expectations" suggest further that the investigator is to be allowed to choose such traits from a heterogeneous collection which will "appropriately" fit a preconceived idea of a dominantmentality—a procedure entirely inadmissible. On the whole, these "results" of the logico-meaningful method leave the impression that Sorokin either is attempting to put the proverbial cart before the equally proverbial horse, or that he supports a method which can end only in tautologies. These remarks pertain to his negative statement of the same idea, namely, that we can know a number of facts about a culture in case the expected variables and traits are not found. "Expected" refers to those traits which will fit into a logically integrated unity. The assertion, therefore, that if the expected traits do not appear the culture is not logicallyintegrated, is a mere restatement of everything comprehended by the word "expected". Sorokin treats his readers to more mysticism when he answers his ownmethodological questions, for instance, " How can a unifying principle be discovered?" This question, probably the most integral of the group, isurprisingly branded as "almost superfluous." "the principle may be sug-
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0006
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, gested," he says, "by observation, statistical study, meditation, logical analysis even dreaming and by v. hat is called mere 'chance,' or 'intuition.' " With observation and statistical analysis we unequivocally agree. I.ogical analysis, too, may be admitted if care be exercised to escape the misconceptions Sorokin harbors with regard to logic. A principle suggested by meditation, dreaming, chance, or intuition, however, would be worth nothing unless qualified, tested, and approved by objective scientific techniques—the very "sensate" methods which Sorokin pretends to scorn. Previous to such qualification the principle can be only the most tenuous hypothesis. Sorokin is unlikely to deny this, for doing so would leave him in the unusual position of advocating a dream sociology, with specters of key principles floating around in a bewitchingly logico-meaningful night The point to be emphasised is that in spite of quarts of vitricl pouredon scientific methods," they must be utilized in every instance of logico-meaningful integration to save the key principle from being a stale and empty hypothesis. The guarantee that it is an adequate principle must come from an impartial test by different observers, it is true, but an impartial test would exclude meditation, chance, dreams, and intuition. Sorokin comes very close to the contemned "sensate" traits in his answer to a question to which he ascribes importance: "How can it be ascertained that a given principle of logical integration is valid?"' "The answer is that the criteria of validity are virtually the same as for any scientific law"; the principle must "by nature be logical" and it must furthermore stand successfully the test of relevant facts. If a principle must successfully stand this test it may be pointed out merely that some method will have to be used for testing, and that the criteria of impartiality and objectivity will peremptorily remove the logico-meaningful "method" from consideration. Professor Somlcin frequently utilizes the creations and systems of thegreat musicians, philosophers, poets, and painters as examples of logico-meaningful unities so supreme and sublime that they elude mathematical and logical analysis and, accordingly, causal-functional modes of integration. The following phrase is typical; "the specific logico-meaningful systems created by . . , such men as Phidias, Praxiteles, Aeschylus, Pindar, Sophocles, Polygnotus, Socrates, and later Plato."1,1 In the first place, it is impossible to agree that the sculptures of Phidias and Praxiteles, the odesof Pindar, the paintings of Polygnotus, the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and the dialogues of Plato (there is no extant work of Socrates) constitute logico-meaningful unities. Plato, for instance, gives students of the dialogues much trouble precisely because he did not create a "system."
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0007
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, It would be enlightening if Professor Sorokin would explain—logico-li.earing'olly the completely unrelated myth in the Protagoras. Sorokin himself falters with regard to the logico-meaningful unity of systems when he lists Kant, Fcehner, Planck, Einstein, Duhem, Tschuprov, Brunschvlcg, Heisenberg, and Bridgman both as determinists and indeterminists. We may venture the additional remark that a sociological theorist of many ages hence will experience difficulty in "feeling" or "intuiting" the logico-meaningfuly unity of Contemorary Sociological Theories and Social and Cultural Dynamics though they appeared in the same culture and are the work of one man. Even if the logito-meaningful unity of particular systems could be conceded, however, it is irrelevant. In order to proceedwith sociological analysis we need to know whether the creations of all ofthe men at a particular time, taken together, provide a key principle for theculture to which they belong. The integration of a manifold of traits into aculture constitutes this different and more perplexing problem—a problemto the solution of which the constant reitetation of the logico-meaningfulunity of single systems contributes nothing. It is interesting to note Professor Sorokin's comparison ot the logico-meaningful and the causal-functional methods. In a number of placeshe asserts that both are necessary for a study of social-cultural phenomena,but the approbation which shines upon the former and the opprobriumwhich rains upon the latter serve to expose his methodologicalpredilections.The major difference is that functional or causal integration is externaland inferential and applies to the "inorganic, organic, and supemrganicworlds. Logico-meaningful integration, on the other hand, is intimateand internal, and finds its proper locus only where there is mind and meaning. When Sorokin draws this distinction he misses a point which not even antithetical doctrines of epistemology would deny; namely, that all knowledge is inferential. The problem lies in what has been called an "internalization of the external" and that is what happens in any knowing process,regardless of method and irrespective of the fact that the Kantian question, "How can we know?", has not yet adequately been answered. Unless Sorokin is a subjective idealist and assumes that the ontology of all culture traits and cultures is of the nature of mind, it is quite apparent that even logico-meaningful integration must be external to the mind whichknows it. That is, the integration must be of phenomena or else we aredealing with a highly subjective relationship which is integrated or notdepending upon the pleasure of the person who perceives it. This, of course,is what the logico-meaningful method amounts to; it is of the essence of
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0008
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, subjectivity. We learn also that "All the causal-functional connections in the field of the natural sciences. . . are free from additional logical bonds."The mere fact that no relationship in the natural sciences exhibits the supremely integrated unity of "logic" and "meaning" throws us on guard with respect to the logico-meaningful .nteararion of cultural relationships. Most interesting of all, however, are the following statements: If variables A and B are not met with regularly, nor coexist, nor follow each other in immediate sequence, nor vary uniformly, such variables can not be declared to be connected causally...Considerably different is the situation in regard to logico-meaningful connection. Theoretically (and nor infrequently in fact) this Sort of association is conptidiensil.de even when the interrelated fragments are met with at quite different periods, and in quite dirlerent places, and only once or a fewfor illustration Sorokin claims that;['someone could demonstrate that the rate of divorce and the use of yellow leather shoes always fluctuate together, "we should have to agree that they were connected functionally, though we would not have the slightest understanding of why it is so";" and again, that this situation would represent an "exceptionless causal associate, and falls victim to the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc which he himself attacks. There is no reason why the most strict functionalist would have to agree that the rate of divorce and the use of yellow leather shoes are causally or functionally related if they fluctuate togetherEven more appalling, however, if Sorokin can find an "exceptionlesscausal association" In the covariation of yellow leather shoes and divorces, what kind of logico-meaningful connections will he perceive when he studies phenomena which are not met with regularly, which do not coexist, which do not follow one another in immediate sequence, which do not vary together uniformly, and which are "met with at quite different periods" and "in quite different places If a relationship can lie discerned between such variables the culture they attempt to define could no; possibly have eventhe lowest form of association, "spatial adjacency." Apparently the logico-meaningful method is so superior that it can find relationships where none exists. The statements of Sorokin In this connection, rather than demonstrating differences between the causal-functional and the logico-meaningful methods, simply throw a powerful spotlight upon the fallacies of the latter. Probably the most serious methodological misconception in the entire exposition occurs in the assertion that "the investigation of each type of culture integration requires its own special procedure and brings about
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0009
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, its characteristic results."" In other words, when the cultural synthesis is causal-functional we use the causal-functional method; when it is logico-meaningful, the logico-meaningful method is prescribed. I lere Sorokin assumes that he knows what kind of integration a chance congeries of culture traits will possess before he investigates them. But we cannot know what kind of an integration the culture ttaits exhibit until we apply a method to them and, once discovered, we no longer need to choose a "special procedure." This error cannot lightly be dismissed. We use a method in ordet to determine whether a particular group of culture traits are related at all. The relationship discovered may be (following Sorokin) mere spatial adjacency, relationship by an external factor, causal-functional, or logico-meaningful relationship. We do not in advance guess the kind of a relationship into which the traits fall and then apply the methodbearing the same label as the guess. On the contrary, a method justifies itself only when it enables us to discover both that some culture traits are related and that others are not; that in one case we have an integration and that in the other we do not. Sorokin's argument leads him into these shoals because he pins the word "logico-meaningful" both on a type of integration and on his method.Admitting for a moment that the logico-meaningful "method" is a method, we discover that it does indeed differ very significantly from thecausal-functional, in a way, however, which Sorokin has not recognized. The logico-meaningful method consists in clapping a key principle on a culture caught at a moment of time, primarily at its point of highest integration. The causal-functional method, on the other hand, consists In the application of the cateiiori of causal iry to the problem of social change. Cause is a "function" of time; an effect follows a cause in a chronological sense; the cause-effect relationship can not occur in timelessness. Simply to articulate a key principle of a culture, however, represents a task of description of culture elements as they are integrated at a moment of time. The difference is that between description of status and explanation of change, between social statics and social dynamics. And all the keys, principles ofintegration, and Leitmotinen in the world will nut begin to explain how a culture changes. How then do cultures change according to Sorokin ! Apparently we shall have to wait for the fourth volume for a full discussion of the "dynamics" in the title of the work. Certain clues may be detected, however, in the following statements:Systems change according to the course of life which is predetermined for them by their very nature. The functions, change, and destiny of the sytem are determined not only andnot so much by the external circumstances (except in the case of catastrophic acci-
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1937_December_v2n6-p 0010
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, dents), but by the narure of the system itself, and by the relationship between its parts. An aeroplane can fly, but a cow cannot; a gun can fire, but a spade cannot. Whatever are the external circumstances, man cannot help passing from childhoodto senility and sooner or later dving. Likewise, a cultural system has its own logic of functioning, change, and destiny, which is a result not only (and regularly not so much) of the external conditions, but of its own nature.Its life course is set down in its essentials when the system is born. This is one ofregulation and self-direction."Needless to say, this invocation of the Hegelian "Geist" and the Spengler-ian "Destiny Idea" sheds no light on the infinitely complex problems ofsocial change. Why does a gun shoot? It is its nature to. Why does an airplane fly? It is its nature to. Why does a culture change? It is its nature to.All of which explains exactly nothing. Rather it recalls a stanza of IsaacWatts;Let dogs delight to bark and bite, For God hath made them so; Let bears and lions growl and fight, For' tis their nature too.In response to these dicta of Sorokin the remark suffices that to talk aboutimmanent causation, inner logic of change, immanent self-regulation andself-direction, and other hypostases is merely to name our ignorance of thefactors involved, to postpone the time when we shall finally come to an understanding of these phenomena, and to delude ourselves that we have an answer when we have only a phrase. Taking these doctrines seriously willencourage the observation of sociological problems through a metaphysicalTurning, finally, to the ubiquitous jig-saw puzzle with which Sotokioillustrates the logico-meaningful method, it seems that the separate piecesrepresent mere spatial adjacency before they arc put together and the completed picture manifests a different, a logico-meaningful form of integration. We sit down before the puzzle, decide upon a logico-meaningful unity,and attempt to juxtapose the parts in a way which will correspond to such aunity. To quote Sorokin, "In attempting to solve the puzzle one may makeseveral guesses, each of which is logically irreproachable, as to what thefigure is going to be. That, of course, is precisely what we do not do.Instead, with no definite picture in mind we begin to put the pieces together and finally a picture appears. In like manner scientific anthropologists and sociologists articulate the pattern or key principle of a culturefrom an inductive analysis of its traits. Further, what does Sorokin implywhen he characterizes a guess as "logically irreproachable?" A guess isnot logically anything; it bears, in its pristine state, no possible relation to
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Logico-meaningful method of P. A. Sorokin and Rejoinder reply by Sorokin
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, logic. However, let us assume for a moment that any guesses we might hazard concerning the jig-saw puzzle and, by Sorokin's own analogy, the key principle of a culture, are logically irreproachable. What crumbs of significance are left over for the "logico-" in logico-meaningful integration? If we cannot reproach a principle on logical grounds it will harry our investigation until some "meaningful" factor arises to eliminate it. If we assume, on the other hand, that a key principle intuited by the logico-meaningful method, though logically irreproachable, may be either correct or incorrect, it follows inevitably that some other method will have to beinvoked to decide. And so, we come to the regrettable conclusion that the "logico-meaningful method" is neither logical nor meaningful, nor indeed a method. Takenin any other than a Pickwickian sense it becomes a suspicious mixture of logic, meaning, sensation, science, mysticism, and intuition: "logic" and"meaning" because these words unaccountably hamd their way into its name; "sensation" because we are asked to sense the supreme unity of culture traits; "science" because of Sorokin's half-hearted though significant attempts to draw scientific analogies; "mysticism" because the supreme unity may be imparted on the swift wings of aesthetic inspiration; and "intuition" because Sorokin himself suggests that the key principle may be intuited, guessed, felt, or dreamed. The "cultural premises" upon which this critique is based may be questioned by Professor Sorokin with some justification. They are admittedly cribbed, cabined, and confined by "sensate" mentality with all its positivism, "scientism," objectivism, and anti-intellectualism. An appreciation or criticism of the logico-meaningful method on the premises of an "ideational" culture transcends both the boundaries of this paper and the kenof the writer. If it is maintained, however, that in the pure "ideational" culture for which the author of Social and Cultural Dynamics yearns there there would also be no sociology. Rejoinder: Pitirim A. Sorokin. It seems that Mr. Bierstedt's main objection to the logico-meanigful integration of culture and method, as stated in the foregoing pages, is the following: There is no logical realtionship between objects or phenomena; logic, as the formal science of the structure of thought, applies to the words we use to describe, This page sums up the critique by Bierstedt. Sorokin replies to article
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Rejoinder
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Several book reviews bound together in a red book entitled Sorokin Reviews, them. Not cultures but only what we say about them can be logically integrated. Nor are culture traits logically related....Logical judgements find their proper locus in propositions: not in events or objects...Objects and traits either exist or they do not exist...Only propositions and judgments are susceptible of....logically related claims. By his own statement, then, the critic readily admits the applicabilityof the category of logical relationship to words, propositions, and judgments. Very well. Now are not these items a part of culture and cultural phenomena: Are not such main compartments of culture as science, philosophy, religion, law, ethical teachings, literature, many forms of music (opera, oratorio, musical comedy, etc.), ceremonies, mores, and customs composed largely of words, propositions, and judgments, with their substitutes and derivatives? How much would remain of culture and its components if the words, propositions, and judgments, with their substitutes and derivatives, were removed? Apodirtlcallv, therefore, it is clear that culture and cultural phenomena are made up largely of words, propositions, judgments, their substitutes and derivatives, and, of course, of the ideas,images, and meanings externalized by them. If the logical category is, according to my critic, applicable to all of these, self-evidently it must pertain to at least a major part of culture. Thus from the very premises of the reviewer there follows an unavoidable conclusion which completely substantiates my position and ivalidates the claims of an adverse point of view. The conclusion pertains not onlyto oral words, propositions, and judgments, but also to their derivatives and substitutes. It extends over all forms of language, such as written words and propositions, gestures, mathematical and other symbols, mimetic, ritual,and ceremonial forms. The enormous variety of signs, picutres, songs, customs and mores through which the meangs are expressed and conveyed to others cannot be excluded. When all of theses varieties of "language," together withtheir substitutes and derivatatives, are considered in their totality they will be found almostcoextensive with culture and cultural phenomena. Since by the critic's admission the logical category is relevant to all of them, this means it is applicable practically to almost the whole universe of cultural phenomena.It is unnecessary to proceed with further details, as the argument has reduced itself to the syllogistic form given below. Major premise: The category of the logical relation ship is applicable toall words, propositions, judgments, and to their substitutes and derivatives (signs, symbols, pictures, getstures, ceremonites, rituals, music, customs, etd.) Minor premise: Culture and cultural phenomena consist largely of words,propositions, judgments, and their derivatives and substitutes.Conclusion: Therefore, . the category of logical relationship is applicable to the larger part of culture.
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